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Abstract
This research empirically tests for the determinants of 
corporate risk taking and the risk-return relationship in 
China, with the sample of listed companies’ financial 
data from 2004 to 2012 in the electric power and thermal 
industry in China. The authors use a dynamic model 
that included risk, corporate performance, industry 
performance, performance expectations and aspirations. 
The results presented in the test suggest that corporate 
performance and past risk both have a negative influence 
on corporate risk, while performance expectations and 
aspirations have a positive influence on corporate risk. It 
provides evidence of the argument on the corporate risk-
return relations of Behavioral Theory of Firm. A low-
performance corporate will seek risk actively and a high-
performance corporate will avoid risk. The phenomenon 
of “Bowman’s paradox” exists in China’s enterprises.
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INTRODUCTION
The risk-return relationship has always been the important 
issues of research in economics and strategic management. 
The traditional Finance Theory considers that the 
association between risk and returns is positive and high 
risk is accompanied by high returns and vice versa (Sharpe, 
1964; Fama & MacBeth, 1973). However, high risk-low 
profits companies and low risk-high profits companies 
can be always found in the reality. Many researchers 
have conducted a research on this phenomenon. Sparked 
by Bowman (1980, 1982, 1984), many recent studies of 
strategy have included risk measures. Part of the attention 
has focused on what Bowman described as a paradox. 
Using a capital markets analogy, he predicted that risky 
projects and investments would need to offer higher 
earnings than other projects to be attractive and that by 
extension, variable income flows would be associated 
with high average income. Instead, he found negative 
associations between variance in returns and the level 
of returns in most of 85 industries that he chose. Since 
Bowman (1980), numerous studies have investigated risk-
return connections. Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1985, 1986) 
found some industries with positive associations between 
returns and variance in returns and some with negative 
associations. They also found that the associations varied 
over time. Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988) reported 
a positive association between returns and variance in 
returns for above-average performers and a negative 
associations for below-average performers. This pattern 
is consistent with Bowman’s concept of “risk seeking by 
trouble firms” (Bowman, 1982, p.33),which he associated 
with the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). 
Related studies have focused on risk and return relative to 
diversification (Amit & Livnat, 1988; Bettis & Mahajan, 
1985; Chang & Thomas, 1987); business unit risk assessed 
in terms of both accounting-based measures of systematic 
risk (Aaker & Jacobson, 1987) and a variety of accounting 
and operational risk measures (Woo, 1987); and corporate 
risk and return relative to structural and operational 
variables (Jemison, 1987; Singh, 1986). Fiegenbaum and 
Thomas (1988) provide an excellent survey of the risk-
return literature.
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However, the research on risk in enterprise strategic 
management in China is stillin its infancy. Existing 
literature focus on the risk of specific strategic behavior 
and related strategy research (Zhu & Zhu, 2003; Liu, 
2004), review and evaluation on western strategic 
risk (Liu & Li, 2003; Zhang, 2009), the formation 
mechanism of strategic risk (Yang & Xi, 2002), strategic 
risk identification (Guo, 2005), the analysis of strategic 
risk elements (Wang & Xiang, 2005) and the strategy 
control system of risk (Long & Xia, 2006). But there 
is little research on the relations between enterprise 
risk and returns. Only Zhu (2008), Zeng (2008) and 
Zeng (2011) tested the enterprise strategic risk-return 
relations empirically. They all concluded that there is 
negative association between risk and returns. But this 
research considers that there are some problems in their 
research, which has a direct impact on the credibility of 
the empirical results. The main problems are: (a)their 
empirical analysis only focus on analyzing the association 
between strategic risk and returns, which was rough. The 
analysis neglected other factors’ possible impact on the 
strategic risk-return relationship and possible structural 
complex relationship between these factors and risk-
return. Further research needs to adopt the multiple 
regression model or structured model to explore possible 
relationship between the strategic risk and returns more 
deeply. (b) Zhu Zhiming used the event study method, 
Zeng Yongyi used the element analysis while Zeng jin 
only used the association analysis. They all pointed 
that the multivariate regression analysis may be a better 
research method in their papers. (c) Zeng (2008) used 
conventional variance method to measure risk. But then 
Zeng (2011) found that because of the left-skewed data, 
the use of conventional variance method leads to false 
empirical results. Zhu zhi ming and Zeng (2011) both 
used the ordinal method to measure strategic risk. The 
method’s applicable conditions are harsh, which requires 
that industries have a clear boundary and stable structure 
and companies’ risk is steady available for time to be 
added. These conditions are hard to all be satisfied in the 
study of multiple industries for a long time window. They 
all pointed that there are many other risk measures to be 
selected , such as the standard deviation of the securities 
analysts’ forecasts of earnings per share for the year 
and so on, which may measure the strategic risk more 
accurately. But because they could not acquire the related 
data, they did not use this measure.
 Based on summarizing the scholars’ research, this 
research adopts the standard deviation of the securities 
analysts’ forecasts of earnings to measure enterprises’ 
risk and build the risk model based on Cyert and March’s 
(1963) behavioral theory of the firm. This research selects 
the listed companies in the electric power, heat production 
and supply industry in China as our sample and adopts 
the multivariate regression analysis to identify the 
determinants of enterprise risk and the possible association 
between risk and performance in China. The answers to 
the questions addressed in this research maycontribute 
to knowledge in three areas. First, by specifying and 
testing a model of corporate risk taking, this work 
attempts to advance understanding of the determinants 
of Chinese corporate risk taking and performance. It 
advances the research on risk by (a) presenting and 
estimating a dynamic model based on a specific theory of 
organizations, (b)using an ex ante measure of risk taking. 
Second, because Cyert and March’s (1963) behavioral 
theory of the firm underlies the model tested, the research 
can be seen as a large sample test of that theory in China. 
Third, the research provide robust empirical evidence 
from listed companies for the existence of Bowman 
paradox in China.
1 .   L I T E R AT U R E  R E V I E W  A N D 
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
 The risk-return relations research dates back to the 
Knight’s (1921) pioneer work in the 1920s. With strategic 
management has gradually become an independent 
discipline in 1970s, the risk-return relations research got 
the attention by the strategic management researchers. 
Researchers generally consider that Bowman’s（1980）
research is origin of risk issues research in strategic 
management. Compared to the positive association 
between risk and returns, Bowman assumed that 
enterprise’s high risk project needs to offer higher returns 
than other projects in order to be attractive, namely 
the variance in returns and average returns needs to 
be positive associated. However, among 85 American 
industries Bowman tested, there is significant negative 
association between the variance in enterprises’ ROE and 
its averages in 56 industries, while the association presents 
positive only in 21 industries and the rest 8 industries 
presents no association at all. This discovery has violated 
the mainstream theory “high risk with high returns” at that 
time ,so was called “Bowman paradox”. Since Bowman’s 
significant discovery, many researchers conducted a 
large number of further research on the enterprises’ risk-
return association and have made huge progress in the 
empirical and theoretical research. At present, there are 
two mainstream theories to explain the enterprises’ risk-
return association in academia: Contingent risk decision 
hypothesis and Strategic Endowment hypothesis. Ruefli 
and other researchers conducted a comprehensive review 
on it (e.g., Ruefli, 1999; Nickel, 2002).
Currently, the most widely accepted theory about 
enterprises’ risk-return association is “Contingent risk 
decision hypothesis”. Decision theory accepts three 
attitudes towards risk (a) risk averse: investments with less 
risk will be referred at the same expected return level. (b) 
risk seeking: investments with higher risk will be preferred 
at the same expected return level. These decision makers 
will assume higher risk because they will get higher 
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probability of reaching extraordinary returns because 
of the high variance values. (c) risk neutral: the higher 
expected return investment will be selected, independent 
of its risk level.The conventional finance theory usually 
assumed that decision makers are risk averse in the 
investment choice model (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
This assumption leads to the risk-return association 
presents positive (Oviatt, 1991). Since Bowman’s 
discovery, researchers began to doubt the traditional 
assumption of risk aversion. If decision makers are risk 
seeking, the risk-return association may be negative. That 
is to say, decision makers’ attitude and behavior in face of 
risk affect the risk-return association. Risk averse leads to 
the positive risk-return association and risk seeking leads 
to the negative risk-return association. Contingent risk 
decision hypothesis covers two main theories: Prospect 
Theory and Behavioral Theory of the Firm.
Prospect theory considers that the decision makers’ 
attitude towards risk is affected by their current situation 
and forecast decision consequences, which is associated 
with the reference point selected at decisions making time. 
When the expected results of an alternative are “good”-
that is to say, they are higher than the reference point-the 
decision maker shows a risk-averse attitude (Fiegenbaum 
et al, 1995). When the expected results are “bad”-lower 
than the reference point-the decision maker will be risk 
seeking (Johnson, 1992; Sinha, 1994). High expected 
results lead to a risk-averse attitude and, therefore, a 
positive risk-return relationship, while low expected 
results lead to a risk-seeking attitude and, hence, a negative 
relationship. Prospect theory also points out that this 
second relationship will be steeper than the first (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979). Prospect theory has been proven by 
some empirical research (e.g., Chang & Thomas, 1989; 
Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1988; Sinha, 1994). 
Behavioral theory is the second theory that explains 
the paradox from the attitude towards risk showed by 
the firms, and it leads to similar hypotheses to prospect 
theory. With this focus, firms are described as large 
systems of standard operating procedures, where 
managers take decisions based on two different measures: 
the performance level they aspire to (aspirations), and the 
performance level they expect (expectations). According 
to this theory ,the amount of risk managers will accept 
will depend on the expected performance in relation to 
the aspiration. When the expected performance is higher 
than the aspirations, managers consider that the firm is 
performing well, so no change is needed. Therefore, the 
association between risk and return present positive. If 
managers expect performance to fall below the aspiration 
level, creating a gap between aspirations and performance 
sufficient to create a sense of crisis, a major organizational 
change in the firm will be needed to find procedures and 
techniques that increase the performance. This change 
involves risk for the firm, because the consequences of 
change are usually less well known than the consequences 
of the status quo. Finally, if no solution is found, managers 
will be forced to set lower aspirations. Therefore, the 
association between risk and return present negative.
Behavioral theory has been proven by some empirical 
research (e.g., Bromiley, 1991; Greve, 1998; Palmer & 
Wiseman, 1999). According to Strategic Endowment 
hypothesis, strategic risk and return both are two 
dimensions of the natural results that corporate strategic 
endowment causes and they are interdependent, but 
there is no causal relationship between them. Some 
enterprises own monopoly of strategic resources such 
as the dominant market position, managers with high 
ability, diversification strategy, consumer orientation and 
product patent and so on, which enable the enterprises 
to maintain low risk level and obtain high return at the 
same time. Strategic Endowment hypothesis considers 
this negative association may be natural results of 
corporate strategic endowment heterogeneity. Strategic 
Endowment hypothesis has also been proven by some 
empirical research (e.g., Andersen, Denrell, Bettis, 2007; 
Kim et al, 1993).
In addition, a few scholars tried to explain the risk-
return relationship from Risks with Implicit Costs 
Hypothesis and Statistical Artifacts Hypothesis. According 
to Risks with Implicit Costs Hypothesis, companies’ high 
risk and large variation of performance will increase the 
possibility of company defaults. It makes the company 
stakeholders such as suppliers, employees and customers 
unwilling to trade with companies and put specific 
investment into companies under the same currency 
compensation conditions. So high risk will reduce 
companies’ operating income and increase operating costs, 
finally reduce companies’ performance. This hypothesis 
has been proven by a few empirical research (e.g., 
Deephouse & Wiseman, 2000; Zeng, 2011). However, 
Statistical Artifacts Hypothesis considers that the 
strategic risk-return empirical relationship is only caused 
by the model misspecification. Maybe the association 
between risk and return is significantly negative, but this 
association has nothing to do with causality and so there is 
no need to discuss its causal meaning from the theoretical 
perspective. Some researchers have tested on it (e.g., 
Denrell, 2008; Henkel, 2009). 
In conclusion, we can infer that academia reaches no 
agreement in the risk-return causal relations, but most 
scholars’ research all support the mainstream theory: 
Contingent risk decision hypothesis and Strategic 
Endowment hypothesis. Compared to western listed 
companies, under Chinese special national conditions, 
the listing age of listed companies in China is short 
and their development is not mature. It means that our 
country’s listed companies have a long way to go in 
raising management ability, training company core 
competitiveness in order to gain “high performance, low 
risk” sustainable development. So Strategic Endowment 
hypothesis is not suitable for our country’s enterprises 
27 Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture
ZHANG Ruiwen; YANG Fan; LI Xiaodong (2014). 
Canadian Social Science, 10(2), 24-32
(Zeng & Yang, 2011). In two theories explanations of 
Contingent risk decision hypothesis, Behavioral Theory of 
the Firm is more convincing and scientific than Prospect 
Theory. The reasons are as follows: (a) Behavioral 
Theory of the Firm researches enterprises’ behavior, 
while Prospect Theory researches individuals’ behavior; 
(b) compared to Prospect Theory, Behavioral Theory 
of the Firm considers the risk-return relationship is not 
only influenced by the risk attitude, and also influenced 
by other corporate traits. The model in this research is 
established on Behavioral Theory of the Firm and is a 
large sample test of Behavioral Theory of the Firm under 
China’s unique conditions.
2.  RESEARCH DESIGN
2.1  Model Development 
The model used herein is based on Cyert and March’s 
behavioral theory of the firm. Bowman (1980) and other 
researchers wish to make causal statements but are 
dealing with strictly cross-sectional data. Their analyses 
usually associate variance in returns with average returns 
calculated using data from the same period, making it 
impossible to ascertain the determinants of risk taking 
and the impact of performance on risk taking. Both Singh 
(1986) and Woo (1987) argued that time series models 
incorporating lags were needed to test such relations more 
clearly. Following their suggestions, this research attempts 
to establish time series models to research the impact of 
performance on risk.
Cyert and March viewed firms as large systems of 
standard operating procedures. Managers in firms have 
both levels of performance they aspire to (aspirations) 
and levels of performance they expect (expectations). 
If expectations fall below aspirations, managers search 
for solutions that can raise expected performance to the 
aspirations level, and if they cannot find such solutions, 
they lower aspirations. 
Following the behavioral theory of the firm, the 
current model includes four basic variables: performance, 
aspirations, expectations, and risk. The model of risk 
taking in this research is :
Risk t+1=b0+b1 performance t+b2 industry performance t 
+b3 expectations t+b4 aspirations t+b5risk t+e,
where 
 bi = parameters to be estimated,
 t = year,
and
 e = error term.
2.2  Hypotheses
Performance. The direct impact of performance on risk 
taking is central to work by Bowman (1980, 1982, 1984) 
and by Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1985, 1986, 1988) and 
was significant in Singh’s (1986) research. Fisher and Hall 
(1969) presented an economic argument for the impact 
of performance on risk taking: If the utility to a firm of 
each additional dollar in profits is slightly less than the 
utility of a previously gained profit dollar (declining 
marginal utility of income), the expected utility of an 
investment will decline with increases in the variance of 
returns for that investment will decline with increases in 
the variance of returns for that investment. For a high-
variance investment to have equivalent utility to a low-
variance investment, the high-variance investment would 
need to show higher mean performance. Fisher and Hall 
concluded that “this implies that earnings should be larger, 
on the average, for firms with greater variation in their 
earnings than for firms with little earnings variability” 
(1962, p.82). At the same time, some empirical research 
in China also found that China’s listed companies’ risk-
return association presented significant negative (Zhu, 
2008; Zeng, 2011; Zeng, 2008).
Hypothesis 1：Performance has a negative influence 
on risk（b1 <0 )
Industry performance It is hypothesized by industry 
performance will have a negative influence on risk. 
The argument parallels that for individual companies. 
If low performance results in firms taking risky actions, 
an industry that on the average has low performance 
will be populated with firms taking risky actions. If 
competitors are taking risky actions, such as introducing 
new technologies and new products, a firm of interest 
will be forced to take such actions to keep up, even if its 
performance level is high.
Consider, for example, a high-profit firm in a low-
profit industry, in which the introduction of new products 
is the main area of competition. Most firms in the industry 
are making low profits and consequently take risks by 
introducing new products. The high-profit firm will be 
under pressure to match the competitive moves of the 
other firms in the industry and so will also take risks by 
introducing new products. Thus, low industry performance 
should increase risk taking by the firms in an industry over 
and above the influence of a firm’s own performance level.
Hypothesis 2: Average industry performance has a 
negative influence on risk (b2<0)
Aspirations and Expectations Cyert and March 
(1963), March and Shapira (1987) suggested that if a firm 
aspires to a higher level of performance than it expects 
to attain under the status quo, it looks for ways to raise 
its performance. Given the role of routines in increasing 
predictability (March & Simon, 1958), it is likely that 
some of the changes to routines occasioned by attempts 
to increase performance will reduce organizational 
predictability. Such reductions should increase uncertainty 
with respect to the outcomes the organization may incur 
and may in particular increase income stream uncertainty. 
In an examination of players’ responses to a strategic 
marketing game, Lant and Montgomery (1987) found 
that performance below aspirations resulted in riskier 
choices and more innovative search than performance 
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that met or exceeded aspirations. Although Lant and 
Montgomery used actual performance to predict risk, 
I followed the behavioral theory of the firm and used 
expected performance. Doing so allowed differentiation 
between the direct effects of performance on risk taking 
and the effects of the aspirations-expectations process. 
The income stream of a firm that makes few changes 
should be more predictable-less risky-than the income 
stream of a firm that makes many changes. Thus, the level 
of aspirations should have a positive influence on risk 
taking, and expectations should have a negative influence.
Similar hypotheses can be based on prospect theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). According to that theory, 
the level of a firm’s aspirations serves as a target or 
reference level; firms that anticipate returns below 
that level will be risk taking, and those that anticipate 
returns above it will be risk avoiding. Thus, increases in 
aspirations (the target) will be associated with increases 
in risk taking, and increases in expectations (anticipated 
returns) will be associated with decreases in risk taking. 
Because the sources of the data on aspirations and 
expectations used here differed, the scales on which 
they were measured may not be identical. Consequently, 
in this research the difference between aspirations and 
expectations could not be usefully calculated. But if risk 
is a function of aspirations minus expectations, aspirations 
should have a positive influence on risk and expectations 
a negative influence. 
Hypothesis 3: Expectations have a negative influence 
on risk (b3<0)
Hypothesis 4: Aspirations have a positive influence on 
risk (b4>0)
Finally, the model includes past risk to control for 
firm-specific historical influences on risk.
2.3  Measurement 
2.3.1  Measuring Risk
Previous studies of risk-return relations have defined 
risk as the unpredictability of a firm’s income stream 
(Bowman, 1980; Conrad & Plotkin, 1968; Fiegenbaum & 
Thomas, 1985; Fisher & Hall, 1969). These studies have 
measured risk by ex post, or actual, variance of a firm’s 
return on investment or equity.
In this research, risk was measured as the ex ante 
uncertainty of a firm’s earnings stream. Conventional 
measures of income stream risk, such as the variance 
in a firm’s returnon assets (ROA) or ROE, PE ratio and 
the variance of ROA or ROE, PE ratio around a time 
trend, measure ex post uncertainty, which may differ 
substantially from the uncertainty occurring before the 
time period. Ex ante measures of risk may be preferable 
to ex post measures (Bowman, 1982; Silhan & Thomas, 
1986). If a number of analysts forecast the earnings of a 
given corporation, the variance in their forecasts should 
be strongly associated with the ex ante uncertainty of that 
earnings stream. Extensive research on capital markets 
has used the divergence of analysts’ forecasts as a measure 
of uncertainty (e.g., Brown, Richardson, & Schwager, 
1987; Givoly & Lakonishok,1988; Imhoff & Lobo, 
1987). Further, Conroy and Harris (1987) provided results 
supporting use of this measure. In China, Zhu (2008) and 
Zeng (2011) also pointed out that use of this measure may 
be more accurate than conventional variance measures 
and ordinal measures. Bromiley (1991) pointed that use 
of ROA, ROE and PE as measures can get the same 
conclusion. So, this research select securities analysts 
forecast of PE ratio to measure risk. The data used herein 
comes from WIND. 
2.3.2  Other Measures
Bromiley and other scholars found that use f ROA, 
ROE or ROS as measures of corporate performance can 
reach the same conclusion. So, this research use ROE as 
measure of performance and industry average ROE as 
measure of industry performance.
Expectations were measured by the mean of the 
PE ratio forecasts produced by securities analysts. A 
substantial body of literature indicates that such forecasts 
not only predict earnings reasonably well, but also contain 
new information that the stock market has not previously 
considered (e.g., Hassell & Jennings, 1986; O’Brien, 
1988). Management and analysts’ forecasts correlated 
.90 in the data described in McNichols (1989) and .97 in 
the data described in Hassell and Jennings (1986). Thus, 
analysts’ forecasts correlate sufficiently highly with those 
of management to be considered a reasonable proxy. 
This research considers that different companies 
should select different proxies to measure aspirations. 
Based on reviewing previous research, it can be concluded 
that there are two main factors influencing aspirations: 
past performance and average industry performance. 
March and Simon (1958) argued that past performance 
and comparison to the performance of others will strongly 
influence aspiration levels. Other researchers (e.g., Cyert 
& March, 1963; Lant & Montgomery, 1987; Levinthal & 
March, 1981; March, 1988) have modeled aspirations as a 
function of difference between previous aspiration levels 
and previous performance. Eliasson (1976) noted that 
corporations raise targets to slightly above their previous 
performance level. The performance of other companies 
should also influence aspiration levels. Fiegenbaum 
and Thomas (1988) and Lev (1974) argued that average 
performance forms a target level for firms in an industry. 
Herriott, Levinthal, and March (1985) modeled aspirations 
as a function of both past performance and the average 
performance of comparable firms. A firm that performs 
well below industry norms is hardly likely to aspire 
to continued below-average performance. A firm that 
performs above industry norms will not aspire to average 
performance. 
In conclusion, the measure of aspirations used 
here combines past performance and average industry 
performance. For firms with performance above the mean 
for their industry, I presented aspirations by multiplying 
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past performance (ROA) by 1.05. For firms performing 
below their industry’s mean, I set aspirations equal to 
that level of performance. Thus, I assumed that firms 
performing below their industry’s average aspire to the 
average and firms performing above it aspire to improve 
their current position. This measure which conforms to 
the theoretical propositions justifying it and is related to 
previously used measures, appears to be reasonable and has 
been empirically validated in Bromiley’s (1991) research. 
3.  RESULTS 
3.1  Data and Sample Selection
According to China Securities Regulatory Commission’s 
industry classification standard, this research selects our 
country’s electricity, heat production and supply industry 
as our research sample. The reasons of the selection are 
as follows: (a) Electricity industry is a basic industry in 
supporting national economy and social development 
and public utilities, which is of great significance to the 
development of national economy and has important 
influence on it. (b) Listed companies in electricity 
industry own earlier time-to-market and more mature 
development, so it is available to obtain more complete 
financial data so as to meet the requirement of this 
research. This research selects listed companies’ financial 
time series data from 2004 to 2012 year and the data come 
from WIND and CSMAR. Based on research’s need, this 
research eliminated some companies with missing annual 
data. The final data covered 26 listed companies in China. 
This research uses SPSS software to conduct regression 
analysis on the model. 
3.2  Descriptive Analyses 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics. Means, standard 
deviations, minimal values and maximal values are 
reported in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
N Minimal value Maximal value Mean Standard Deviation
Risk t+1
Performance t
Industry performance t
Expectations t
Aspirations t
Risk t
Effective N
142
144
144
144
144
144
142
0.30
-0.43
-0.22
-313.13
-0.04
0.15
1401.58
0.39
0.07
4171.31
0.41
8317.95
31.822 9
0.078 8
-0.009 8
58.661 7
0.092 7
86.851 3
132.832 18
0.088 32
0.103 85
360.526 79
0.065 10
702.628 99
Risk t+1 is the risk of the firm for t+1 year that is the 
standard deviation of securities analyst forecast PE ratio of 
the firm for t+1 year. Performance t is the performance of 
the firm for t year that is the (ROE) A of the firm for t year. 
Industry performance t is the average performance of the 
industry for t year. Industry performance t is the forecast 
performance of the firm for t year that is equal to securities 
analyst forecast PE ratio of the firm for t year. Aspirations 
t is the performance that the firm aspired to for t year. For 
firms with performance above the mean for their industry, 
aspirations t is equal to past performance (ROA) multiplying 
1.05. For firms performing below their industry’s mean, 
aspirations t is equal to that level of performance. Risk t is 
the risk of the firm for t year that is the standard deviation of 
securities analyst forecast PE ratio of the firm for t year. The 
data in Table 1 come from WIND and CSMAR. 
3.3  Empirical Analyses 
Table 2 and Table 3 present the results of goodness-of-fit 
test of the model and F test. By the numbers in the table 
it can be concluded that the model has good fitting and 
passes through F test under the significance level of 1 ‰. 
Table 2
Model R R 2 Adjusted R 2
The standard 
estimate error
1 .666a .444 .424 100.851
 a. predictive variable: (constant), Risk t, Performance t, Aspirations t, Industry performance t, Expectations t
Table 3 
Anovab
Model Sum of Squares df Mean square F Sig.
1 Regression
 Residual error
 Aggregate
1 104 603.183
1 383 255.381
2 487 858.564
5
136
141
220 920.637
10 170.995
21.721 .000a
a. predictive variable: (constant), Risk t, Performance t, Aspirations t, Industry performance t ,Expectations t
b. The dependent variable: Risk t+1
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Table 4 presents the regression results of the model. 
By the coefficients in table 4 it can be concluded that 
hypothesis 1 is supported. Corporate past performance 
(Performance t) has a negative impact on risk taking and 
significant at 0.1 percent level (r= -1974.926, p<0.001). 
It is consistent with many western early research results 
(Bowman, 1982; Singh, 1986) and conforms to Bowman’s 
concept of “risk seeking by troubled firms” (Bowman, 
1982, p.33). Meanwhile, Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988) 
found that low performers seek risk while high performers 
avoid risk. In China, Zeng (2008) and Zeng (2011) also 
both found that the risk-return association of Chinese 
listed companies presented negative at significant levels. 
However, it has some differences with this research. Zeng 
(2011) found that risk taking was the reason while the 
performance was the result. But this research found that 
the performance was the reason while risk taking was the 
reason. Zeng (2011) pointed that the use of correlation 
analysis in his research was rough. Further research needs 
to use multivariate regression model or structured model 
to explore the risk-return relationship deeper. So, this 
research remedies this defect by establishing multivariate 
regression model and using multiple regression analysis 
method to test the sample. This research speculates that it 
may be the reason that leads to the difference between this 
research and Zeng (2011) research. 
Then, why do low performers have the tendency of 
take risk? Zeng (2008) responded to it as follows: (a) 
The management has unrealistic subjective desire; (b) 
The management’s moral hazard risk plays a role in it. 
This research considers that in addition to the above two 
reasons, the corporate governance level may be another 
reason. The firm’s return (performance) may be positively 
associated with its corporate governance level, that is to 
say, the higher the corporate governance level is, the more 
return it gets and vice versa (Zeng, 2010). So, the firm’s 
low performance means that its internal and external 
governance have some problems. The lack of effective 
corporate governance may lead to the lack of necessary 
incentive and supervision of the enterprise management 
and intensify the management’s moral hazard risk. 
Therefore, the firm may take excessive risks.
The coefficient of average industry performance 
(Industry performance t ) is -70.093 and its sig. value is 
0.408, which suggests the hypothesis 2 is not supported. 
It means that in our country’s electricity, heat production 
and supply industry, average industry performance has 
no direct impact on single enterprise. It is different with 
western research results (Bromiley, 1991). This research 
infers that the difference may be caused by different nature 
of sample industries and different national conditions. 
Our country’s electricity, heat production and supply 
industry belongs to monopolized industry, which has low 
degree of competition and high industrial concentration. 
In the industry with higher degree of monopoly and 
industrial concentration, the firm can use its dominance 
of market and suppliers to obtain excess profits, so it has 
less risk from its competitors in the same industry (Zeng 
& Liu, 2008). Therefore, low performance can not force 
the single firm in monopolized industry to match the 
competitive moves of the other firms in the industry. It is 
why average industry performance has no direct impact 
on single enterprise in our country’s electricity, heat 
production and supply industry. 
Contrary to hypothesis 3, expected performance 
(Expectations t) has a positive impact on risk taking 
(r=0.250, p＜0.5). It means that the higher expected 
performance our country’s firm gets, the more likely it is 
to take risks. This conclusion is not consistent with the 
forecast of the behavior theory of the firm and prospect 
theory, but it conforms to western empirical research. 
An empirical analysis once pointed that if corporate past 
performance is controlled and considered as a constant, 
those firms with high expected performance will take 
additional risks (Bromiley, 1991).
Hypothesis 4 is supported, namely Aspirations t has a 
significant positive impact on risk taking (r=1934.594, 
p<0.001). It means that a firm’s risk taking is influenced 
by its aspirations. The higher performance the firm aspires 
to, the greater its risk tendency is. This is consistent 
with the forecast of the behavior theory of the firm and 
prospect theory: If a firm’s aspirations is higher, which 
exceeds its expectations, it will seek every possible way 
to improve its performance, such as introducing new 
products and developing new technology and so on. So it 
is more likely for the firm to be attracted by some risky 
investment opportunities and show stronger risk tendency 
or take more risky behavior. 
Table 4
Coefficients 
Model
Unstandardized coefficients Standardized coefficients  
t  Sig.B Standard errors
1 (Constant) 3.423 16.996 .201 .841
 Performance t -1974.926 203.198 -1.321 -9.719 .000
Industry performance t -70.093 84.426 -.055 -.830 .408
 Expectations t .250 .126 .684 1.986 .049
 Aspirations t 1934.594 285.799 .952 6.769 .000
 Risk t -.127 .065 -.679 -1.973 .049
a.The dependent variable: Risk t+1
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The coefficient of Risk t is -0.127 and its sig. value is 
0.049, namely it is significant at 5 percent level. It means 
that the past risk of companies in our country also has a 
negative impact on risk taking. It may be explained as 
follows: with the rapid development of market economy 
and enterprises in our country in recent years, market 
supervision system and the company governance structure 
gradually tend to be perfect. Under these conditions, if a 
firm took greater risks in the past, its management will 
be under pressure from board of directors or under the 
supervision of China Securities Regulatory Commission, 
so it will take the initiative to reduce its risk in the future. 
CONCLUSIONS
From the model’s regression results, it can be concluded 
that the risk model in this research is validated. Except 
that the industry performance has no significant impact 
on risk taking, other factors including past performance, 
expectations, aspirations and past risk all have significant 
positive or negative impact on risk taking. And, the model 
differentiates between the impact of performance on risk 
taking and the impact of aspirations-expectations on risk 
taking. In China, listed companies’ association between 
risk and performance presents negative, supporting the 
firm behavior theory’s causal reasoning on risk-return 
relationship. However, expectations has a positive impact 
on risk taking, which is different with the behavior theory 
of the firm. 
This research’s empirical results illustrates that 
high risk does not necessarily associated with high 
returns. Low performers may take more risks while 
high performers may take less risks. Bowman’s paradox 
also exists in our country’s enterprises. Because low 
performance leads to high risk ,which makes the firm fall 
into a vicious cycle of low return-high risk, the corporate 
management and dominant stockholders in our country 
should strive to improve the firm’s performance and carry 
out risk management through the firm’s strategic decision 
and daily operations, so that the firm owns a good cycle 
of high return-low risk to promote its development.
This research has certain innovations. First, this 
research adopt the multivariate regression analysis method 
to empirically test the risk-performance relationship of 
enterprises in China. This is the first time for strategic 
management in China to use multiple regression model 
to conduct an empirical research on the risk-return 
relationship. Second, the behavior theory of the firm 
underlies the model tested and this research can be seen 
as a large sample test of that theory in China. Third, this 
research uses the securities analysts’ forecast returns 
standard deviation to measure risk, which is a new attempt 
to measure risk of our country’s enterprises. 
However, there are still some problems to deserve 
further research. This research only selects our country’s 
electricity, heat production and supply industry as the 
sample, so other industries’ risk-return relationship 
deserve further research by scholars. Although the risk 
measure used in this research can be used for reference, 
different risk measures such as proxy variables and 
content analysis of annual reports can be used in further 
research. This research only reveals that the firm’s low 
past performance will lead to risk taking. The impact of 
this risk on future performance deserves future research. 
REFERENCES
Andersen, T. J., Denrell, J., & Bettis, R. A. (2007). Strategic 
responsiveness and Bowman’s risk-return paradox. Strategic 
Management Journal, 28(4), 407-429.
Bowman, E. H. (1980). A risk/return paradox for strategic 
management. Sloan Management Review, 21(3), 17-31.
Bowman, E. H. (1982). Risk seeking by troubled firms. Sloan 
Management Review, 23(4), 33-42.
Bromiley, P. (1991). Testing a causal model of corporate risk 
taking and performance. Academy of Management Journal, 
34(1), 37-59.
Brown, L. D., Richardson, G. D., & Schwager, S. J. (1987). An 
information interpretation of financial analyst superiority in 
forecasting earnings (Working paper). State University of 
New York at Buffalo.
Chang, Y., & Thomas, H. (1989). The impact of diversification 
strategy on risk-return performance. Strategic Management 
Journal, 10, 271-284.
Conroy, R., & Harris, R. (1987). Consensus forecasts of 
corporate earnings: Analysts’ forecasts and time series 
methods. Management Science, 33, 725-738.
Cyert, R. M., & March, J. G. (1963). A behavioral theory of the 
firm. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Deephouse, D. L., & Wiseman, R. M.(2000). Comparing alternative 
explanations for accounting risk-return relations. Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization, 42, 463-482.
Denrell, J.(2008). Organizational risk taking: Adaptation versus 
variable risk preferences. Industrial and Corporate Change, 
17(3), 427-466.
Fama, E. F., & MacBeth, J. D. (1973). Risk, return, and 
equilibrium: Empirical tests. Journal of Political Economy, 
81, 607-636.
Eliasson, G. (1976). Business economic planning. London: John 
Wiley & Sons.
Fiegenbaum, A., & Thomas, H. (1985). An examination of 
the structural stability of Bowman’s risk-return paradox. 
Academy of Management Proceedings, 7-10.
Fiegenbaum, A., & Thomas, H. (1988). Attitudes toward risk 
and the risk return paradox: Prospect theory explanations. 
Academy of Management Journal, 31(1), 85-106.
Fiegenbaum, A., & Thomas, H. (1995). Strategic groups as 
reference groups: Theory, modeling and an empirical 
examination of industry and competitive strategy. Strategic 
Management Journal, 16(5), 461-476.
Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture
Determinants of Corporate Risk Taking 
and Risk-Return Relationship
32
Fisher, I. N., & Hall, G. R. (1969). Risk and corporate rates of 
return. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 83, 79-92.
Givoly, D., & Lakonishok, J. (1988). Divergence of earnings 
expectations: The effect on stock market response to 
earnings signals. In E. Dimson (Ed.), Stock market 
anomalies (pp.272-289).
Greve, H. R. (1998). Performance, aspirations and risky 
organizational change. Administrative Science Quarterly, 
43, 58-86.
Hassel, J. M., & Jennings, R. H. (1986). Relative forecast 
accuracy and the timing of earnings forecast announcements. 
Accounting Review, 61, 58-75.
Henkel, J. (2009). The risk-return paradox for strategic 
management: Disentangling true and spurious effects . 
Strategic Management Journal, 30(3), 287-303.
Herriott, S. R., Levinthal, D., & March, J. G. (1985). Learning 
from experience in organizations. American Economic 
Review, 75, 298-302.
Imhoff, E. A., & Lobo, G. (1987). The impact of earnings 
forecast uncertainty on the information content of 
unexpected annual earnings (Working paper). University of 
Michigan, Ann Arbor.
Johnson, H. J. (1992). The relationship between variability, 
distance from target and firm size: A test of prospect theory 
in the commercial banking industry. Journal of Socio-
Economics, 21, 153-171.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, D. (1979). Prospect theory: An 
analysis of decisions under risk . Econometrica, 47, 262-
291.
K im ,  W.  C . ,  Hwang ,  P. ,  &  Burge r s ,  W.  P.  ( 1993 ) .
Multinationals’diversi1cation and the risk-return trade-off. 
Strategic Management Journal, 14, 275-286.
Knight, F. H. (1921). Risk, uncertainty and profitability. New 
York: Harper & Row Press.
Lant, T. K., & Montgomery, D. B. (1987). Learning from 
strategic success and failure. Journal of Business Research, 
15, 503-517.
Lev, B. (1974). On the association between operating leverage 
and risk. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 9, 
627-641.
March, J., & Shapira, Z. (1987). Managerial perspectives on risk 
and risk taking . Management Science, 33(11), 1404-1418.
March, J. G., & Simon, H A. (1958). Organizations. New York: 
Wiley.
McNichols, M. (1989). Evidence of informational asymmetries 
from management earnings forecasts and stock returns. 
Accounting Review, 64, 1-27.
Nickel, M. N., & Rodriguez, M. C. (2002).A review of research 
on the negative accounting relationship between risk and 
return: Bowman’s Paradox. Omega, 30(1), 1-18.
O’Brien, P. C. (1988). Analysts’ forecasts as earnings 
expectations. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 10, 53-
83.
Oviatt, B., & Bauerschmidt, A. (1991). Business risk and return: 
A test of simultaneous relationships. Management Science, 
37(11), 1405-1423.
Palmer, T. B., & Wiseman, R. M. (1999). Decoupling risk taking 
from income stream uncertainty: A holistic model of risk. 
Strategic Management Journal, 20, 1037-1062.
Ruefli, T. W., Collins, J. M., & Lacugna, J. R. (1999). Risk 
measures in strategic management research: Auld Lang 
Syne. Strategic Management Journal, 20(2), 167-194.
Silhan, P. A., & Thomas, H. (1986). Using simulated mergers 
to evaluate corporate diversification strategies . Strategic 
Management Journal, 7, 523-534.
Singh, J. V. (1986). Performance, slack and risk taking in 
organizational decision making . Academy of Management 
Journal, 29(3), 562-585.
Sinha, T. (1994). Prospect theory and risk return association: 
Another look. Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization, 24, 225-231.
Sharpe, W. F. (1964). Capital asset prices: A theory of market 
equilibrium under conditions of risk . The Journal of 
Finance, 19, 425-442.
Wiseman, R. M., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (1998). Risk and return 
in organizational decision making. Academy of Management 
Journal, 41(2), 330-333.
Woo, C. (1987). Path analysis of the relationship between 
market share, business-level conduct and risk. Strategic 
Management Journal, 8, 149-168.
